Pakistan: Did Asif Ali Zardari, who has proved himself to be a shrewd politician, only imagine a probable military coup?

WHO knows what course contemporary politics in Pakistan would have taken through “Memogate” by the time this gets into print, but it can be said without any ambiguity that this controversy has split wide open the skewed civil-military relationship of a nation beset with problems.

As conspiracies go – mind you, Pakistan is a country fertile with conspiracy theories – this one has conspiracy written all over it whichever narrative one subscribes to. To begin with the memo that gave this controversy its name, Pakistani-American businessman Mansoor Ijaz claimed that a Pakistani official – recently identified by him as Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States – got him to draft and deliver a memo to Mike Mullen, former Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, seeking Washington's help in pre-empting a military takeover following the American raid in Abbottabad to take out Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.

Ijaz made this claim through an opinion piece in Financial Times on October 10. The Pakistan government denied it towards the end of the month. The first denial came from the Foreign Office on October 28. The following day, the President's Office came out with a similar statement, which also questioned Ijaz's credentials. On November 10, Admiral Mullen's office also denied the existence of the memo.

All this prompted Ijaz to come out with a second article, detailing the BlackBerry messages that were exchanged between him and the Pakistani official and his American contacts. Names were again withheld, but the Pakistani media worked on the premise that the Pakistani official in question was none other than Haqqani. With the military establishment evidently communicating its displeasure to the civilian government and the needle of suspicion being pointed right at the President's House, given that Haqqani is known to be Zardari's man, the Ambassador was summoned to Pakistan though Ijaz had still not named him.

That would happen a few days later. First, Admiral Mullen's office changed its version; it stated that the memo had been received but not taken note of because it did not appear credible. Soon after, Ijaz named Haqqani, who maintained that he was being set up for remaining a critic of military interference in political affairs and described Pakistan's political and media scene as “a Democratic Government with 36 Fox News Channels”. After returning to Pakistan, he also offered his computer and phone records for examination while calling for an investigation into Ijaz's BlackBerry records.

Simultaneously, from mid-November, there has been a steady flow of nuggets of information to certain Pakistani publications, from which it transpires that the Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Shuja Pasha, visited London in October to examine Ijaz's phone records to verify his claims. According to this narrative, it was only after the verification of the memo that the military leadership raised the issue with Zardari.

But even before Haqqani's name was bandied about, cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan named him as the author of the memo while addressing his “game-changer” rally in Lahore on October 30. How he knew that for a fact – given that this piece of information was then privy only to Ijaz and Pasha – is a question that begs an answer amid growing speculation of Khan being promoted by the military establishment.

Confusing? Of course, this is meant to confuse. And, that is how Pakistan's politics operates, full of wheels within wheels. The irony is that while an influential section of the mainstream media is baying for Haqqani's blood – and, in turn, Zardari's – not much attention has been paid to the actual contents of the memo, particularly the threat of a coup, which amounts to subversion of the Constitution.

In the memo, Zardari is alleged to have made six offers to the U.S. in return for putting pressure on the military establishment and the ISI to prevent them from dislodging the democratically elected government. The offers include an independent inquiry into allegations of Pakistan harbouring Osama bin Laden, fixing responsibility for it, replacing the national security structure with trusted advisers with historical links to the U.S., and eliminating Section S of the ISI, which is charged with maintaining relations with the Taliban and the Haqqani network. The memo also promises to take action against the Al Qaeda operatives remaining in Pakistan, including its chief Ayman Al Zawahiri, and Taliban leaders Mullah Omar and Sirajuddin Haqqani, or to give U.S. military forces the “green light” to conduct operations to capture or kill them on Pakistani soil.

Pointing out that the raid on Osama bin Laden had increased fears within the military-intelligence establishment of the U.S.' stealth capabilities to enter and exit Pakistani airspace at will – making nuclear assets legitimate targets – the memo also states that the government will develop an acceptable framework of discipline for the nuclear programme.

GERALD HERBERT/AP

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